The Adaptive Venue Shopping Framework: How Emergent Groups Choose Environmental Policymaking Venues by Ley, Aaron J. & Weber, Edward P.
University of Rhode Island
DigitalCommons@URI
Political Science Faculty Publications Political Science
2014
The Adaptive Venue Shopping Framework: How
Emergent Groups Choose Environmental
Policymaking Venues
Aaron J. Ley
University of Rhode Island, ajley@uri.edu
Edward P. Weber
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/psc_facpubs
The University of Rhode Island Faculty have made this article openly available.
Please let us know how Open Access to this research benefits you.
This is a pre-publication author manuscript of the final, published article.
Terms of Use
This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable towards Open Access Policy
Articles, as set forth in our Terms of Use.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science at DigitalCommons@URI. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political
Science Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@URI. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@etal.uri.edu.
Citation/Publisher Attribution
Aaron J. Ley & Edward P. Weber (2015) The adaptive venue shopping framework: how emergent groups choose environmental
policymaking venues, Environmental Politics, 24:5, 703-722, DOI: 10.1080/09644016.2015.1014656
Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2015.1014656
1 
 
The Adaptive Venue Shopping Framework: How Emergent Groups Choose Environmental 
Policymaking Venues 
 
Aaron J. Ley, Ph.D. 
Department of Political Science 
University of Rhode Island 
ajley@uri.edu 
 
Edward P. Weber 
Ulysses G. Dubach Professor 
School of Public Policy 
Oregon State University 
edward.weber@oregonstate.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
Scholars have succeeded in producing several explanations for why groups choose to pursue 
their policymaking goals in different venues. A synthetic framework that explains the choices 
these groups make is developed through two case studies describing a conflict over the 
environmental problem of agricultural field burning.  Emergent, boundedly rational, groups with 
a mission to clear the air of the pollutants associated with field burning, are found to be choosing 
venues by strategically assessing the institutional context. The particular institutional context that 
matters involves three primary elements: the group’s mix of resources, opponents’ resource 
strengths, and the degree of venue accessibility.  These initial choices allow groups to generate 
new resources, to learn about which strategies do and do not work, and to change venues on the 
basis of their new resources and what they have learned. 
Keywords: Venue Choice, Field Burning, Policy Change, Adaptive Venue Shopping, adaptive 
learning, collaboration 
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Introduction 
The world of environmental politics and policy is no stranger to policy conflict driven by 
political interests representing changing societal values and practices at odds with the legal status 
quo (Brick and Cawley 2008).  Many of these policy battles are resolved locally, but the high 
stakes environmental problems that groups and policymakers are struggling over are increasingly 
taking on global dimensions (Rootes 2013).  It has become common for environmental advocacy 
groups seeking change, especially newly formed groups, to encounter major resistance from 
entrenched interests benefiting from, and using their resources to, prevent change.  This means 
that nascent groups, often lacking large and politically mobilized constituencies, are outgunned 
both financially and in their application of legal and/or scientific expertise in policymaking 
venues, ‘the institutional locations where authoritative decisions are made concerning a given 
issue’ (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, p. 32).  One consequence is that the policymaking venues 
available to them, such as legislatures, courts, administrative agencies and, increasingly, 
collaborative institutions (see Lubell, Henry and McCoy 2010), remain dominated by established 
interests who successfully resist change.  How do groups navigate this difficult policy terrain 
when their adversaries have come to dominate the policymaking venues that make policy change 
possible?  
Scholars have not overcome the challenge of providing a sufficient answer to this 
question despite its practical and theoretical importance to all groups that are seeking policy 
change.  In order to bring greater clarity to this question, we explore how newly formed groups 
place demands on various institutional venues during a major, ongoing controversy over the 
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practice of agricultural field burning in the U.S. states of Washington and Idaho.  Employing a 
multiple case study approach, we ask, ‘how might a nascent environmental group, or any group 
for that matter, navigate a political system marked by multiple policy venues in their quest for 
change?’  Interestingly, we find that the newly formed environmental and public health interest 
groups in each case chose to pursue the very same policy goals – clean air – in different policy 
venues.  Why? 
 Through personal interviews with key participants and archival research, we identify 
three factors that prove critical for improving our understanding of the complex process of venue 
choice: the behavior of newly emerged groups; the institutional context in which they make 
decisions about choosing venues; and the role that learning plays in choosing strategies for 
pursuing their primary policy goals.  Our framework builds on the insights of the Ecology of 
Games Framework developed by Lubell (2013); it assumes the existence of multiple venues at 
various levels of the American system.  Our core theoretical argument, and synthetic framework, 
the Adaptive Venue Shopping (AVS) Framework, is grounded in the idea that newly emerged 
groups base their strategic choices about where to pursue their policy goals by assessing the 
institutional context in which they are embedded. This process, driven by the trial-and-error 
decision-making typical of boundedly rational groups, entails an important degree of adaptive 
learning about which strategies do and do not work.  The products of this adaptive learning 
process are deliberate changes in strategy that lead to venue change (see Heikkila and Gerlak 
2013).  Further, as adaptive learning occurs, groups begin generating and assembling resources 
that can be transferred from one institutional venue to another, thus improving their prospects for 
successfully altering the policy status quo. 
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Before exploring and developing the empirical evidence in the two cases of field burning, 
we provide a full discussion of the AVS Framework, along with the research methods employed 
for this study.  After laying out our theoretical argument in more detail, we describe the 
institutional context that shapes the decisions that are made by emergent environmental groups, 
the methodology for our multiple case study design, and our findings. 
Emergent groups, institutional context, and adaptive venue shopping 
A number of theories have traditionally been used to better understand the process of venue 
shopping in the American political system.  First, instrumental rational choice theories grounded 
in bounded rationality (e.g., cognitive limitations, imperfect information) argue that ‘coalitions 
will seek to utilize their resources efficiently [and strategically]…to produce the most policy 
benefits for the cost incurred’ when pursuing policy change in the context of multiple 
intergovernmental venues (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999, p. 142, Weible 2007, Weible and 
Sabatier 2007).  Second, Lubell et al. (2010) accept these same behavioral assumptions and 
develop the ecology of (policy) games involving multiple policy venues.  In the ecology of 
games, actors prefer particular venues and thus ‘spend energy developing [their skills and 
resources] in the new venue and move away from other [possible] games [or venues]’ (Lubell et 
al. 2010, p. 290).  This approach challenges the analytical tradition of focusing on one policy 
venue at a time, and emphasizes how adaptive policy systems furnish policies that are the 
product of multiple decisions being made in multiple venues over long periods of time (Lubell 
2013). 
Pralle (2003), on the other hand, places primary emphasis on structural barriers and the 
cultural and ideological pre-dispositions of group leaders. Taken together, she argues that groups 
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develop preferences for certain venues, meaning that potential opportunities in other venues are 
often missed because groups will not strategically change course (Pralle 2003, p. 242).    
Finally, Baumgartner and Jones (1993) emphasize the critical interplay between image 
framing and a venue’s image receptivity—the idea of an amiable venue. Successful political 
actors can either manipulate images to favor their preferred venue, or react to a changing image 
by altering their choice of venue. The problem with this second choice, however, is that the 
actor’s ability to influence policy outcomes may diminish since there is no guarantee that the 
new venue will be favorable to their interests.   
 These theories are all useful in their own way, but also limited in their efficacy given the 
complex empirical realities of venue shopping that are demonstrated in our cases.  Instead, the 
evidence from our case studies supports a synthetic adaptive learning framework in which 
several of the elements in existing venue choice theories are evident, yet not individually capable 
of explaining the choices made in our cases.  Our AVS Framework describes how emergent 
groups with a mission, in this case, to clear the air of the pollutants associated with field burning, 
are choosing venues using a strategic calculation, or assessment, based on the institutional 
context where multiple policy games are playing out.  Of central importance is the discovery that 
during the years-long environmental battles we analyze, emergent groups willingly adapted when 
their initial strategic choices fell short and applied what they learned to new venue choices where 
the goal of policy change later became fulfilled. 
When emergent environmental groups are choosing venues, three important elements 
shape the institutional context: the group’s mix of political, legal and technical resources; 
opponents’ resource strengths; and the degree of venue accessibility, which is a combination of 
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opponents’ degree of control over a venue and a venue’s image amiability or receptivity (see 
Table 1).   
The Institutional Context 
Group resources   
Groups and alliances participating in the policymaking process have access to three main types 
of resources that they utilize in their quest for their preferred policy outcomes. The three forms 
of resources are political, legal, and technical. Groups can develop political resources in a 
number of ways. Some examples include using lobbyists, undertaking large-scale mobilization 
campaigns to cultivate public opinion, or working closely with leading legislators or powerful 
policy entrepreneurs already favorably disposed to a group’s preferred policy outcome. When 
groups possess legal resources they have the ability to access and deploy legal expertise capable 
of recognizing the opportunities and constraints posed by laws, regulations, and the court system. 
Technical resources are developed through the quality and amount of factual and scientific 
evidence in support of a group’s position. These resources, or the ability to ‘access’ them even if 
created by others, or by events and crises, is necessary if a group has any hope of successfully 
achieving its goals.  
Yet, simple possession and deployment of a particular form of resource does not always 
equate with the fulfillment of a group’s policy goals since different venues are more or less 
receptive to the type of resource possessed by a group (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999, p. 143).  
For example, groups with strong legal resources have a natural affinity for the courts, while those 
with strong political resources are likely to prefer legislative venues.  Technical resource strength 
often confers an advantage in administrative decision venues, yet is also a resource that is helpful 
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for both political and court-based venues, especially in highly technical policy areas such as 
human health and environmental harm. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Opponents’ resources  
The emergent groups in our case studies, however, did not make choices over where to shop 
based solely on their own resource strengths or weaknesses. Consideration is also given to the 
mix and strength of opponents’ resources.  This is because they know that the true strength of 
their own group resources are not absolute, but rather are relative to opponents’ strengths as 
applied to possible venues. 
 
Venue accessibility    
The degree of venue accessibility also matters to groups.  Accessibility is a function of an 
opponents’ degree of control over a venue and a venue’s image amiability or receptivity 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Groups make this calculation because the transaction costs 
associated with venue choice vary with the degree of venue dominance by opponents and how 
favorable a venue is to a group’s preferred image framing. Strong dominance by opponents and 
low image amiability in a particular venue increase the transaction costs for those seeking policy 
change because it increases the costs a group must devote to fulfill its goal of policy change, 
while a weak presence by opponents and high image amiability necessarily lowers expected 
transaction costs (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999). 
The degree of opponent control or dominance of a venue is separate from a group’s 
resource levels precisely because not all groups successfully translate a high level of resources 
into a similar degree of venue dominance. In some cases the lack of success is simply due to 
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group ineffectiveness. However, the nature of certain venues works against a strong correlation 
between resource level and venue dominance because venue decision rules (e.g., courts and stare 
decisis; administrative agencies and the role of administrative law) and structure (administrative 
agencies and career bureaucrats) can and do mitigate the effects of high resource levels, no 
matter how effectively they are applied.  
 A venue’s image receptivity, on the other hand, considers how different ‘frames’ of an 
issue are perceived and received by the different legislative, judicial, administrative, and 
collaborative venues. Groups often seek to define and frame public problems in ways that gain 
the attention of, and therefore influence, the policymakers that matter in the various institutional 
venues (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, Stone 2001). As part of this, there is an ongoing and 
critical interplay between image framing and a venue’s image receptivity. Successful political 
actors are sensitive to this interplay and try to manipulate images to favor their preferred venue.    
From an emergent group’s perspective, a venue’s image receptivity can and does have a 
connection to the degree of dominance exercised by opponents over specific venues.  For 
example, if an opponent’s resources translate into strong dominance of a venue then it is 
considered blocked, hence a poor venue to advance the emergent group’s interests and one in 
which image receptivity is not a factor. Yet, if an opponent’s degree of control is weak or leaves 
a venue contested (neutral), then image receptivity comes into play as a factor in venue choice. 
In short, the Adaptive Venue Shopping (AVS) Framework posits that emergent groups, to 
the best of their ability, strategically assess the institutional context and choose a policy venue 
most favorable to the policy change they seek.  Table 2 displays the AVS Framework in action as 
applied to a group’s two easiest venue choices – the ‘best’ and ‘worst’ choices for achieving, or 
not, a preferred policy outcome.  The easy ‘best’ choice for an emergent group seeking to change 
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policy is when the group possesses a high level of resources ‘matched’ to a venue, opponents 
possess weak resource levels with respect to the same venue, opponents have weak control over 
the venue, and the venue has a strong reputation for favoring the emergent group’s image of the 
policy in question. Venues to be avoided—the easy ‘worst’ choice—display a mix of weak 
emergent group resources with respect to the venue, strong opponent resources, strong 
dominance of the venue by opponents, and low image receptivity (amiability). 
Venue choices for new groups, of course, are not always easy because, as described in the 
introduction, the deck is often stacked against them by entrenched, powerful opponents.  This 
means that emergent groups can, and do, make flawed venue choices despite their intention to 
make the ‘best’ one.  To anyone familiar with bounded rationality this is not surprising, but the 
key to the Adaptive Venue Shopping Framework is what happens after such failed choices.  The 
field burning cases outlined below show that emergent groups learn and adapt by moving on to 
another policy venue where they expect, and in these two cases, secure better results. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Research methodology 
This study uses a multiple case study design to probe the question of venue choice.  Multiple 
case studies are appropriate when research questions require in-depth and contextual analysis, 
and ask ‘why’ actors behave the way they do (Yin 2009).  This study builds a synthetic 
framework that identifies the variables that matter to groups as they are making venue choices.1 
We chose to limit our analysis to the policy conflict over agricultural field burning in the Pacific 
Northwest because it involved a similar environmental conflict that lasted over an appropriate 
                                                
1 For more on the development of synthetic frameworks, see Cairney (2013) 
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period of time in each of the states (more than ten years). Furthermore, our cases control for 
ideology, culture, and geography because both policy conflicts occurred in the Inland Northwest 
regions of Eastern Washington and Northern Idaho.  This feature of our research design meets 
Gerring’s (2001) description of similar cases and a most-similar research design where, ‘a few 
cases…are as similar as possible in all respects except the outcome of interest, where [the cases] 
are expected to vary’ (p. 210).  Our data include personal interviews conducted with farmers, 
representatives from the grass seed industry, personnel from administrative agencies, lawmakers, 
journalists, advocacy groups, and attorneys.  In all, we interviewed 35 individuals across the two 
states through a snowball sampling method and also include archival data from local newspaper 
accounts, public meeting records, and organizational newsletters.  We turn now to our cases.  
Agricultural field burning in the Inland Northwest 
Lawns and golf courses around the world are planted and maintained with Kentucky Bluegrass 
seed grown in eastern Washington State and northern Idaho. Since the 1940s, farmers in both 
states have burned the plant’s post-harvest crop residue because they believe doing so ‘shocks’ 
plants into production, exposes the plant to more sunlight, and minimizes the growth of weeds. 
The practice also minimizes labor costs and soil erosion because, without field burning, farmers 
replant their fields every three to four years, compared to the six to eight years required for 
burned fields.  
Field burning also poses public health risks because minimizing the impact of smoke by 
burning when favorable weather conditions permit is complicated by unpredictable wind patterns 
that push smoke into the densely populated areas of Spokane, Washington and Coeur d’Alene, 
Idaho. Efforts to regulate the practice by single jurisdictions tend not to work because smoke 
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drifts across state and county lines, causing doctors to warn those with asthma, cystic fibrosis, 
and other respiratory illnesses to stay indoors or leave during the field burning season that 
extends from August through October.  Finally, tourists and recreational enthusiasts avoid 
visiting the region during the summer burning period, even though they are attracted to the 
beautiful forests, rolling hills, streams and lakes, and abundant wildlife. 
By the early 1990s, there was mounting pressure in both states for policy change as 
public acceptance of relatively unrestricted field burning diminished.  Environmentalists and 
public health advocates in Idaho and Washington used this opportunity to pursue policy change, 
and succeeded by instituting stronger burning restrictions that resulted in clearer skies.  Yet the 
same policy goals in these two states were pursued in different institutional venues, with Idaho 
environmentalists twice choosing the judicial venue, while advocates in Washington opted for 
collaboration before successfully pursuing a mixed venue strategy employing a local 
administrative-legislative venue coupled with a state-level administrative venue. 
 
Idaho field burning and venue choice: a judicial strategy 
The public health risks associated with field burning in Idaho led to the formation of Safe Air for 
Everyone (SAFE) in the late 1990s.  SAFE began as a coalition of interests from the medical 
community (i.e., Idaho Medical Association) and clean air advocates (i.e., the American Lung 
Association), but later added support from the real estate industry and local Chambers of 
Commerce due to concerns that field burning was impacting the local real estate and tourism 
economy (Olsen and Hollander 1999).  Despite SAFE’s modest beginnings, its membership grew 
to 400 members by 2002 (Russell 2002). How did this emergent group approach its venue 
shopping choices? The short answer is that they selected two venues across a span of roughly 
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five years (2002 to 2006), targeting each venue on the basis of their own resource strengths, their 
opponents’ strengths, their opponent’s degree of control over different venues, and the expected 
image receptivity of a venue. 
 
Choosing the federal courts 
Despite being a broad-based coalition, SAFE, 400-strong, was still quite small and unlikely to 
wield much political clout relative to the rest of Idaho where concentration of population in and 
around the southern city of Boise, the state capital, is concentrated.  Grass growers, consisting of 
about fifty individual farming operations, were also well organized through their professional 
association, the North Idaho Farmer’s Association (NIFA).  NIFA assessed ‘per-acre burning 
fees’ which allowed the group to raise funds for continuously lobbying the legislative and 
executive branches of Idaho government to protect farming practices from regulation.  NIFA also 
maintained close relationships with other extractive industries tied to agriculture, such as mining 
and forestry interests.  This alliance conferred a significant political advantage, especially in the 
legislature, given that agriculture, mining, and forestry together dominate Idaho’s economy by 
contributing $3.6 billion, or fourteen percent of GDP (Idaho Department of Labor 2009).  
 The political dominance of agricultural and other extractive industries explains why grass 
growers were comfortable with a legislative strategy.  In 1980, at the behest of the Idaho Farm 
Bureau, Idaho passed one of the nation’s first and strongest right-to-farm laws that protected 
agricultural practices from lawsuits (the law’s protections were enhanced more in 2003). The 
dominance of the legislature by farmers and their allies also helps to explain the lax enforcement 
of Idaho’s State Implementation Plan (SIP) for the federal Clean Air Act (CAA).  Idaho’s SIP 
was approved by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1972.  It limited field 
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burning in all areas of agriculture because of recognized human health risks and handed 
enforcement authority to the Idaho Air Quality Board.  Yet, the legislature abolished the agency, 
before reestablishing it in 1982, and renaming it as the Department of Environmental Quality, 
with a caveat listing field burning as an allowable source of pollution under the CAA.  The 
legislature then repealed rules on agricultural burning in 1986 (Dukes 2007b, Idaho Department 
of Environmental Quality 2008).  Finally, in 1999 Idaho lawmakers passed legislation placing 
regulatory jurisdiction over field burning in the Idaho State Department of Agriculture (ISDA), a 
clientele agency designed to promote, not regulate, the agricultural industry.  
In sum, the ability of SAFE’s opponents to dominate and effectively block access to the 
state-based legislative and administrative venues, and the historical acceptance of an economic 
growth ‘frame’ across both legislative and administrative institutions in Idaho (Powers and 
Barrett 2001), signaled that a judicial venue offered SAFE the best bet for successfully pressing 
its agenda (see top portion of Table 3). The executive director of SAFE expressed the 
organization’s frustration about the likelihood of positive legislative action:  
The Legislature has never really taken the lead on ensuring the public health, so we’ll continue to 
work any and all avenues that we can in order to make sure that the Legislature understands the 
public health crisis.  We would prefer not to go to court, but in the absence of any clear leadership, 
we most certainly will be prepared to take that step if we have to (Hedberg 2002).   
 
Another interviewee put it more succinctly, ‘there was no legislative solution.  The legislature 
was part of the problem’ (Personal Interview, PHA). 
Compared to SAFE’s limited political resources, the group’s access to legal resources 
from outside groups and from public interest attorneys who volunteered their talents made legal 
resources their strongest resource. This blend of factors led SAFE to choose the courts, but a 
history of state judicial decisions that consistently favored economic interests and the state’s 
clear right-to-farm laws prevented such suits from being filed in state courts.  The federal courts, 
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on the other hand, have established a decades-long track record of being receptive to a public 
health framing when suits are filed under environmental laws like the CAA (Weber 1998).  This 
receptivity to SAFE’s preferred legal ‘framing’ of the battle over field burning was reinforced by 
the fact that Idaho is under the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, a federal 
appellate court with a reputation for handing down liberal rulings in the area of environmental 
and human health hazards. 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
In February 2002, SAFE filed suit against Idaho growers under the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) (42 U.S.C. § 6901), which regulates the disposal of 
hazardous waste.  SAFE argued that crop residue constitutes a solid waste material that, when 
burned, becomes hazardous and requires regulatory action by the EPA.  The decision to file suit 
under RCRA was a critical one for SAFE because, in doing so, they became committed to 
pursuing their goals through the federal court system and generated new technical resources to 
go along with their legal resources.  To this end, their strategy included recruiting  
[e]xpert witnesses [who] were retained to demonstrate that grass residue met the legal definition of 
agricultural waste as defined by RCRA; that the smoke which was making people ill was in fact 
originating from grower’s [sic] fields, and that the high particulate readings on air quality monitors 
were correlated with symptoms seen in the general public complaint records (SAFE 2002). 
 
After three days of oral arguments before the Federal District Court in Boise, ID, SAFE’s suit 
was dismissed after the judge ruled that burned crop residue did not meet the definition of 
hazardous waste.  According to the judge, ‘The Court finds the burning of residue is not a 
“disposal” and, further, the residue is not a “solid waste” because it is neither discarded or [sic] 
abandoned, but instead, used as part of the growth process.  Therefore RCRA does not apply’ 
(Alkire 2002). 
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Doubling down on the federal courts 
Despite the judge’s decision in the case, SAFE was emboldened to continue seeking a 
legal victory through the federal court system and did so again in 2006 (see lower portion of 
Table 3), but the organization remained active at the state level as well.  In the meantime, it 
maintained its core group of members by playing defense as best it could in the state-based 
legislative and administrative venues, while also supporting efforts to improve the quantity and 
quality of the scientific information they were collecting.  In fact, despite losing the RCRA court 
case, SAFE continued using the scientific resources generated from its activities in the judicial 
venue.  The case ‘created a public record – a very undisputed record – about how this practice 
harms people.  [We] still couldn’t find a legal angle to stop this practice but it was sort of this 
moving train about here’s how harmful the [field burning] is’ (Personal Interview, ATY). 
In addition, the case strengthened SAFE’s legal resources by creating new professional 
relationships with other attorneys involved in federal public health and environmental litigation. 
During SAFE’s appeal of the RCRA decision to the Ninth Circuit, the group developed 
relationships with Sierra Club’s legal organization, Earthjustice.  Their interactions with these 
attorneys led to the discovery of a fatal flaw in Idaho’s SIP that led to the maintenance of a 
court-based strategy, policy change, and thus, the fulfillment of SAFE’s policy goals.  
 While examining Idaho’s SIP, the group found Idaho did not articulate field burning as 
an allowable source of air pollution (Smith 2005).  SAFE then notified state officials within the 
ISDA of the omission and that it was prepared to litigate the issue in federal court. Opponents of 
SAFE—the pro-field burning interests—acted to preempt the lawsuit by passing legislation 
amending the SIP during the 2005 legislative session.  The amendment specifically recognized 
field burning as an allowable form of pollution under the CAA, a revision that EPA approved 
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that year. Members of SAFE protested the move by ‘the farm-lobby-legislature’ and the fact that 
‘EPA rubber stamped it’ (Personal Interview, PHA) because, from their perspective, EPA failed 
to assess the public health impacts of field burning prior to accepting the change in the SIP.  
EPA’s response was that, in approving the amended SIP, it was clarifying what had already been 
existing practice in Idaho (Geranios 2005).  SAFE appealed this decision, arguing that the EPA 
violated the Administrative Procedures Act by not considering the public health consequences of 
approving the practice of field burning (Smith 2005).   
After SAFE appealed the EPA’s decision, the case immediately came before the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals. Interpreting the plain meaning of Idaho’s SIP, the three judge panel 
agreed that EPA’s approval of the SIP was ‘arbitrary and capricious.’ The court thus ordered the 
EPA to reconsider its approval of field burning and required Idaho to conduct a comprehensive 
analysis of field burning’s impact throughout the state (Dukes 2007a). In response to the 
decision, and with farmers and lawmakers growing weary of continued litigation over field 
burning, Idaho Governor Butch Otter (R-ID) supported the idea of the ISDA spearheading a 
compromise between SAFE and the growing community to resolve the persistent problem of 
field burning.  By January 2008, a tentative agreement between farmers and public health interest 
culminated in a new smoke management program transferring regulatory jurisdiction over field 
burning to the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality, an agency designed to improve air 
quality and with power to declare air quality emergencies (Buley and Stewart 2008, Hedberg 
2008). The negotiated agreement, which required final approval from the Idaho State 
Legislature, then passed the legislature unanimously and was signed by Governor Otter in March 
2008. 
Washington Field Burning and Venue Choice: A Multi-Venue Strategy 
18 
 
In 1998, the State of Washington, through its Department of Ecology (DOE), became the first 
state to ban the burning of bluegrass.  Most field burning occurred in eastern Washington near 
the city of Spokane, which was within five miles of the northern Idaho region described in the 
previous case study.  This case explains how Washington arrived at their field burning ban and 
describes the multiple venue choices made by clean air advocates along the way to their final 
success.  In short, after analyzing the institutional context--their own in-group resources, 
opponents’ resource strengths and their dominance of particular venues, and venues’ receptivity 
to their ‘framing’ of the problem—clean air advocates in Washington moved in a decidedly 
different direction than SAFE did in Idaho.  Instead of the courts, they initially chose a 
collaborative decision-making arrangement (see top of Table 4).  But finding no success there, 
and with the advent of a better organized advocacy group called Save Our Summers (SOS), clean 
air advocates shifted strategy and successfully sought policy change through both a local, mixed 
administrative-legislative (elected board) venue and a state-level administrative venue (see 
bottom of Table 4). 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
A tough setting leads to a collaborative venue 
Jurisdiction over air pollution in Washington State rests with the Department of Ecology.  In 
order to tailor regulatory policy to local jurisdictions, the state’s1967 Clean Air Act grants 
concurrent regulatory authority to county-based boards such as the Spokane County Air 
Pollution Control Authority (SCAPCA).2  SCAPCA’s five appointed members are selected by 
the County Commission, two cities (Spokane, City of Spokane Valley), several smaller cities in 
the County, and one at-large member from the community.  The inherently conservative nature 
                                                
2 SCAPCA was later renamed Spokane Clean Air. 
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of Spokane County politics allowed farmers to focus their efforts on influencing the selection of 
board members sympathetic toward agricultural practices.  To advance these efforts, growers 
formed the Intermountain Grass Growers Association (IGGA) in the 1960s to monitor SCAPCA 
activities and to regulate field burning only minimally.  While some citizens attended meetings 
to complain about air quality in those early days, they were unorganized and not able to compete 
with the influence of IGGA.   
 By 1987, Spokane violated federal CAA standards governing small particulate matter, so 
DOE and SCAPCA began assessing the inventory of practices contributing to poor air quality.  
Without widespread public support and in the absence of any advocacy groups to support its 
effort, SCAPCA proposed new regulations in 1990 that reduced the ‘burning season’ and the 
numbers of acres to be burned from roughly 31,000 in 1990 to 18,108 in 2000. Over 200 
members of the grass growing community arrived at the public hearings to oppose the new rules 
(Bayne 1990), outnumbering the handful of citizens testifying in favor of stricter controls 
(Sullivan 1990).  In the end, IGGA and pro-field burning interests succeeded in watering down 
the new rules by increasing the 1990 baseline to 35,000 acres and allowing field burning to 
continue into the indefinite future without any reduction in acreage (versus a phase-out) (Yates 
1990, Spokane County Air Pollution Control Authority 1990). 
 Opposition toward the practice of field burning escalated when it became evident that 
little was being done to regulate the practice, causing a group of loosely organized stakeholders, 
led by the American Lung Association, to begin addressing the problem through a collaborative 
institution.  Advocates for cleaner air recognized that the ‘clean air’ frame they were trying to 
advance could not compete in regulatory agencies with the grass growers’ claim, supported by 
strong technical resources and classical economic theory, that regulatory limits on field burning 
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guaranteed the economic demise of the grass seed industry.  The general lack of resources, 
whether legal, technical or political, within the nascent clean air coalition led its members to 
embrace the collaborative possibility as perhaps their best, if not only, chance to achieve their 
agenda of less field burning and cleaner air. 
 Coupled with their resource calculation, clean air advocates knew that, by definition, a 
collaborative institutional forum gave them a fighting chance because its primary purpose was to 
produce win-win outcomes in which all stakeholders are made better off than before.  
Additionally, stakeholders besides clean air advocates began noticing the negative effects of field 
burning in the region. One was the Soil and Water Conservation Society (SWCS), which 
produced a position statement explaining how ‘[c]onflicting interests have become so polarized 
and emotion-charged that it may be very difficult to achieve a rational solution,’ while also 
calling for the ‘effective resolution of conflicts and resource use problems arising from this 
issue’ (Soil and Water Conservation Society 1990, p. 2).   Shortly afterward, the Spokane 
Chamber of Commerce declared ‘the need to preserve and improve air quality in the Inland 
Northwest’ (Spokane Chamber of Commerce No Date).  The chamber recognized that ‘the grass 
seed industry is an important economic force in the regions [sic] economy’ (Spokane Chamber of 
Commerce [No Date]), but nevertheless joined with clean air advocates to participate in the 
Inland Northwest Field Burning Summit between 1990-1995. Other Washington State interests 
included farmers and seed processing companies who used the summit to show how the industry 
already had in place voluntary regulations through IGGA.  On the public health side, the loose 
coalition of tourism interests, the American Lung Association, the medical community, 
SCAPCA, and the Washington State Department of Ecology participated in hopes of breaking 
the policy gridlock over field burning. 
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 Although the primary purpose of the collaborative summit was for stakeholders to find 
alternative ways to reduce or eliminate the impact of smoke from field burning altogether, almost 
no progress was made toward resolving the field burning problem during its five year existence.  
In 1994, the American Lung Association announced its withdrawal from the summit, expressing 
frustration that the collaborative process was making little progress toward reducing the impact 
of smoke (American Lung Association 1994).  When SCAPCA hired a new Executive Director 
who was committed to stricter controls over field burning, growers also announced plans to 
withdraw from the summit.  The dissolution of the Inland Northwest Field Burning Summit 
summit became official when, in 1995, farmers secretly and successfully convinced Washington 
state legislators to pass a law weakening SCAPCA’s ability to pass regulations affecting 
growers.   
 The unanimous passage of Senate Bill 5609 in both the Washington House and Senate 
was a moment that forever changed field burning politics in Washington State.  The bill 
preserved SCAPCA’s authority to regulate the number of acres burned, but the agency was no 
longer able to set burning seasons nor could it ban burning on weekends and holidays. In short, 
farmers were still required to respect limits on how many acres they burned, but they could burn 
whenever they wanted, and this meant more days with smoke in the air (Camden 1995). 
 
Strategic adaptation: a simultaneous two venue strategy 
The decision by growers to weaken SCAPCA’s authority caused an organized public backlash 
against field burning, which led to clean air advocates formally establishing the citizens’ group 
known as Save Our Summers in May 1995. Their mission was to eliminate field burning and 
thereby create ‘a beautiful and healthy place for all of us to breathe and raise our children’ (Save 
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Our Summers 1996).  SOS grew quickly and chose a two-pronged strategy for pressing its fight 
against field burning. 
 SOS started where it was strongest.  With a group of politically mobilized citizens at the 
local level, SOS gravitated toward the increasingly contested and accessible SCAPCA, which 
was regulatory in character.  Whatever dominance growers still exercised over the board was 
further diminished as complaints to the air pollution control hotline increased (278 complaints 
were registered in 1995), and large numbers of citizens against field burning, often 80 to 90 
percent of the audience, started dominating SCAPCA meetings (Steele 1995).  Finally, in 1995, 
SCAPCA added a new board member who was publicly opposed to field burning and 
sympathetic to the public health claims emphasized by SOS (Steele 1995).  
SOS also began generating technical resources.  They did so by gathering medical data 
and developing relationships with Spokane’s medical community, including the American Lung 
Association. These new allies brought the power of expertise to bear on behalf of SOS because 
many doctors ‘believed that the medical information - the scientific information - showed that the 
smoke was a hazard…. [A] survey [of] the entire society of physicians [in Spokane asked] … 
whether grass burning smoke was a health problem.  Out of the 600 members, 580 responded, 
yes, it was’ (McLeod 2005).  With the medical community’s help, in late 1995 SOS succeeded in 
convincing the local-administrative board to vote 3-2 to institute a field burning phase-out in 
Spokane County over a seven-year period. Since this new local rule focused on field burning 
acreage only, it fit within the state-based law passed earlier in 1995 by the Washington 
legislature (the law weakened SCAPCA’s ability to tell farmers when they could burn, but did 
not rule out elimination of the practice). 
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Yet, while SOS was pursuing change through SCAPCA it was concurrently seeking to 
convince the state-level DOE to ban field burning because the problem was not confined to 
Spokane County, and the agency had the power to end the practice statewide. Given DOE’s 
overarching regulatory jurisdiction over field burning in the state of Washington, and the fact 
that SCAPCA had been dominated through the years by growers, the strategy made sense.  
SOS’s technical resources, generated from its relationships with the medical community and 
American Lung Association, matched well with the agency’s professionally trained staff, who 
were fluent in the science behind environmental and public health problems and sympathetic to a 
‘public health’ framing of the problem.  The Clinton Administration’s emphasis on rewriting 
rules for small particulate matter generated even more convincing evidence that SOS was able to 
mobilize before the environmental agency, particularly the series of Harvard-based 
epidemiological studies linking mortality with exposure to small particulate matter (Schwartz, et 
al. 1996, Personal Interview, SR). SOS also knew that, in addition to having the right resources 
to bring before an agency, it also needed an agency that was receptive to its preferred framing of 
the problem.  SOS considered that, of all the agencies responsible for regulating environmental 
issues, DOE was the agency most sympathetic to its ‘public health’ framing of the problem and 
the one most likely to act in favor of public health benefits when weighed against the economic 
costs of pursuing them  (Personal Interview, PHA). 
 After SOS successfully convinced SCAPCA to support an end to field burning in 1995, 
growers responded by asking the DOE to overturn the decision by writing statewide rules 
governing the practice of field burning (Steele 1996a). Their efforts were rebuked by DOE 
personnel, many of whom were involved with the Inland Field Burning Summit and had 
concluded that farmers acted in bad faith by no longer working through the collaborative process 
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when they went before the legislature to alter SCAPCA’s regulatory powers.  Furthermore, the 
scientific evidence linking fine particulate matter to mortality was becoming impossible for DOE 
personnel to ignore (Personal Interview, SR); DOE expressed support for SCAPCA’s decision to 
phase out field burning and issued a directive that formally supported the decision (Steele 
1996b).  One DOE official noted that ‘the research on the health effects of particulate matter was 
instrumental, so as we got better science about what the consequences were, that just added 
momentum and courage to … agency [decision-makers when it came] … to mak[ing] this 
difficult choice. It didn’t hurt that some of that research was conducted very close to home at the 
University of Washington and Washington State University’ (Personal Interview, SR). 
 The battle in Washington over field burning ended after DOE funded a study that was 
completed by Washington State University economists concluding that the public health costs of 
the practice outweighed its economic benefits (Washington Department of Ecology 1997). With 
persuasive evidence supporting its decision to act affirmatively, the DOE ended the burning of 
Kentucky Bluegrass completely in 1998. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
The policy battles that occurred over the problem of field burning in Washington and Idaho 
illustrate how emergent groups view, react, learn, and adapt to the larger institutional context 
when shopping for a policymaking venue most conducive to their overall policy goals. While we 
are confident in our results, the findings at this point are suggestive and necessarily stand as 
testable hypotheses since they are derived from multiple case studies.  To establish a more 
definitive interpretation of such results, we encourage scholars to consider additional testing 
through a larger series of venue shopping cases involving more than a single policy area or 
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controversy.  While our insights support many individual aspects of existing approaches to venue 
shopping, the key theoretical lesson is that a synthetic approach, which we call the Adaptive 
Venue Shopping (AVS) Framework, is better able to capture the complexity of choice facing 
emergent groups in a multi-venue ecology of games that can and does change over time given 
the capacity of groups to learn and adapt their venue choice strategies.  
The practical takeaway, for its part, should be encouraging to newly formed advocacy 
groups seeking change in environmental policy and other policies too.  This is because, despite 
the resource limitations that are almost always part of the equation for new groups, the AVS 
Framework communicates a method for analyzing the larger institutional context, identifying 
venues vulnerable to policy change, and then crafting an effective venue choice approach based 
on that analysis.  At the same time, the AVS Framework recognizes that just because initial 
venue choices, no matter how rational they appeared at the time, do not result in the desired 
policy change, the learning, adaptation, cumulative resources, and new allies that come from 
these early venue battles can point the way toward other venue choices likely to be even more 
amenable to policy change. 
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Table 1: The Logic of Venue Choice  
   Degree of Venue Accessibility 
 
Decision Venue 
 
Strength of 
Group 
Resources 
 
Opponents’ 
Resources 
 
Opponents’ 
Degree of 
Dominance 
 
 
Venue Image 
Receptivity 
 
Courts 
 
Low to High 
 
Low to High 
 
Weak, 
Neutral/Contested 
or Strong 
 
 
Low to High 
Administrative 
Agencies 
Low to High Low to High Weak, 
Neutral/Contested 
or Strong 
 
Low to High 
Legislature Low to High Low to High Weak, 
Neutral/Contested 
or Strong 
Low to High 
     
Collaborative 
Institution 
Low to High Low to High Weak, 
Neutral/Contested 
or Strong 
Low to High 
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Table 2: The Logic of Venue Choice – Easy Choices 
   Degree of Venue Accessibility 
 
Decision Venue 
 
Strength of 
Group 
Resources 
 
Opponents’ 
Resources 
 
Opponents’ Degree 
of Dominance 
 
 
Venue Image 
Receptivity 
 
Easy “best” 
Choice 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
Weak 
 
 
High 
 
Easy “worst” 
Choice 
 
Low 
 
High 
 
Strong 
 
Low 
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Table 3: Venue Choices in Idaho 
Decision Venue Group 
Resources 
Opponent 
Resources 
Accessibility/Opponent Venue 
Dominance 
Accessibility/Venue 
Image Receptivity 
Choosing the Federal Courts using RCRA 
Courts (federal) 
 
High 
(strongest) 
High Neutral High  
(relative to others) 
State 
Legislature 
 
Low/Limited High Strong Low 
Administrative 
Agency 
 
Low/Limited High Strong Low 
Choosing the Federal Courts using the Clean Air Act and Administrative Procedures Act 
Courts 
(federal) 
 
High High Neutral High  
(relative to others) 
State 
Legislature 
 
Low High Strong Low 
Administrative 
Agency 
 
Medium-High 
(getting 
stronger) 
High Strong Low 
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Table 4: The Washington Case: Clean Air Advocates, Collaboration, and a Two Venue Adaptation Strategy 
Decision Venue Group 
Resources 
Opponent 
Resources 
Accessibility/Opponent Venue 
Dominance 
Accessibility/Venue 
Image Receptivity 
Choosing Collaboration 
Courts (federal) 
 
Low High Neutral High  
 
State Admin 
Agency (DOE) 
 
Low Medium Neutral Medium-High 
Administrative 
Legislative 
(SCAPCA) 
 
Low High Strong Low-Medium 
State 
Legislature 
 
Low Medium Strong Medium 
Collaborative 
Institution 
(INFB Summit) 
 
Medium Medium Neutral/Contested High 
Choosing both the Local Administrative-Legislative and State Administrative Agency 
Courts 
(federal) 
 
Low High Neutral High  
 
State 
Administrative 
Agency (DOE) 
 
Medium-High Medium Neutral Medium-High 
Administrative-
Legislative 
(SCAPCA) 
 
Medium-High 
(and growing) 
High Neutral/Contested Medium  
(moving to High) 
State 
Legislature 
 
Low High Strong Low 
 
